Washington’s Crossing by David Hackett Fischer

On New Year’s day in 1777, Robert Morris sent George Washington a letter, saying “The year 1776 is over. I am heartily glad of it and hope you nor America will ever be plagued with such another.” Today, most Americans think of 1776 as the glorious year of the signing of the Declaration of Independence and the birth of America. Yet it was a dark time, particularly the fall and early winter. The Continental army under George Washington had been defeated at New York (managing a near miraculous escape) and had been pushed back into Pennsylvania. The army was shrinking as things looked worse and as enlistments ran out. The Howe brothers (Admiral Richard Howe and General William Howe), who commanded the British forces, were conducting a successful policy of amnesty, and many from New Jersey and New York signed oaths of loyalty to the king. The British and Hessians (German mercenaries) were confident; Americans were pessimistic. It appeared that the war would soon be over. Then in a period of about three months, starting on December 26, 1776, it all changed.

Fischer’s book is the second I’ve read in the last year or so on this critical period. The first was David McCullough’s 1776 That was a fine book. Washington’s Crossing is even better, going into even more depth on this critical period, focusing on the military campaigns, and really delving into why the men fought and how their ideals and ways of thinking also influenced how they fought.

Both Washington and his army grew over this period. In the battles around New York, Washington made a number of errors. But he also didn’t yet understand how to manage his army. This was a diverse army, and the Yankee fisherman were very different from the Virginia contingent who were different from the backwoodsmen who were different from the Philadelphia associations. They all were fighting for the general cause of freedom, but what it meant to each was somewhat different, and how they operated and needed to be managed were different. In mid-1776, Washington didn’t really understand this; by the end of the year, he did, and his ability to use the strengths of his various troops while allowing them some degree of freedom was an important step in the change in the war. Washington was a commander who sought the opinions of those around him and made up his mind only after vigorous discussion and some consensus building – very different from the British and German commanders.

While Washington’s Christmas night crossing of the Delaware was indeed a pivot point, Fischer makes it clear that it was part of a bigger series of events that as a whole is the true pivot point. Much of it starts with Thomas Paine’s writing of American Crisis in November. He did this at perhaps the very darkest time of the revolution, when American support for the war was wavering, when Washington’s army was disintegrating, and when the Howe’s policy of amnesty seemed to be succeeding. It became a rallying cry for Americans.

Things further went against the British and Hessians due to their often uncontrolled plunder and many instances of rape in New Jersey. This was against the policy of their commands, but the troops plundered the countryside, causing many in New Jersey who might have been more pro-British to feel like they were living in an occupied country – which they were. Reports of prisoner abuse or of surrendering prisoners being killed exacerbated the situation. The Americans began harassing the enemy, something that accelerated at December wore on.

Many Americans have heard the story of Washington’s army sneaking across the Delaware and beating the drunken Hessians. This, however, is not what really happened. The Hessians weren’t drunk. They were, however, worn down from a week or more of constant alarm as Americans shelled them and raided them. They had to stand long watches, had to sleep in their clothes, had to keep their horses saddles. Then, on Christmas night, the weather got worse, and the Hessians were at least able to let more of their men come indoors and rest a little more, since the weather was too bad for any sort of attack. But of course they were wrong. On that brutally cold night, on a river filled with ice flows, Washington led his troops across the Delaware, landing well north of Trenton, then marching them quickly south to Trenton where, attacking from two separate directions, they caught the Hessians by surprise and beat them. He then brought his troops and many Hessian prisoners back over the Delaware before the British troops in Princeton could respond.

In early January, Washington re-crossed the Delaware, held back the combined British and Hessian troops at Trenton, then, overnight, marched around them and beat the British troops at Princeton. He then retreated to Morristown before the larger British force, still encamped outside of Trenton, could respond. The end result was to convince the Continental Army and the colonies that they would win, while shaking the confidence of the British and Germans.

The final months of the winter were spent in the “Forage War.” British forces had to comb New Jersey for forage, while colonial militia would strike at them, often in guerilla war fashion, sometimes in bigger engagements. This brutal winter campaign took much of the strength out of the British army, while again invigorating American morale.

Fischer has a good concluding chapter, where he summarizes the events and what they lead to and discusses how much of the way Americans would interact with one another, conduct their government, and conduct their wars was set down here. It’s here that the principle of civilians control and oversight of a military while the military was responsible for operational detail was established. It was here also that we established the principle of fighting the war according to our principles, as Washington and the Congress assured humane treatment for prisoners as being in line with the principles they were fighting for. The war was also fought in ways that we’d emphasize in subsequent wars – encouragement of bold moves but at the same time taking care to minimize risks, valuing the lives of the soldiers. Finally, he emphasizes that an important distinction was that, while the Americans were willing to fight in a war, they considered it an interruption to their main business of life; they wanted to get it over and return home. He contrasts this with what was true in much of Europe at that time (though it’s no longer true today) of war being a profession of some members of the upper classes, who highly valued honor and for whom war was their life.

He also looks at how so much of this was due to individuals making choices – not only Washington, but those who followed him as well as the politicians. They worked out ways to work together and chose used initiative and creativity to bring together diverse groups of people in common cause.

Fischer’s conclusion is worth quoting:

The most remarkable fact about American soldiers and civilians in the New Jersey campaign is that they did all of these things at the same time. In a desperate struggle they found a way to defeat a formidable enemy, not merely once at Trenton but many times in twelve weeks of continued combat. They improvised a new way of war that grew into an American tradition. And they chose a policy of humanity that aligned the conduct of the war with the values of the Revolution.

They set a high example, an we have much to learn from them. Much recent historical writing has served us ill in that respect. In the late twentieth century, too many scholars tried to make the American past into a record of crime and folly. Too many writers have told us that were are captives of our darker selves and helpless victims of our history. It isn’t so, and never was. The story of Washington’s Crossing tells us that Americans in an earlier generation were capable of acting in a higher spirit --- and so are we.